■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■training programs, establish standards for appointment and dismissal that ensure fairness in personnel management, make recommendations to the Diet and the Cabinet on remuneration and other working conditions for national public employees to compensate for the restriction of basic labor rights, study domestic and international personnel management systems, and implement personnel management measures that are able to meet the needs of the times. In its pioneering years, the NPA faced a great deal of opposition from both inside and outside the Japanese government. There were several reasons for this. One reason was its heterogeneity as an organization. Unlike other ministries and agencies, the NPA is an independent administrative commission with three commissioners (one of whom represents the NPA as president) appointed with the approval of the Diet3. This independence is also unique. The NPA is not subject to the National Government Organization Act and can manage its own internal organization. Its budget cannot be freely modified by the Cabinet, and although it is under the jurisdiction of the Cabinet, it is not under Cabinet control and supervision. Furthermore, Hoover disliked the academic cliques of Tokyo Imperial University, which had produced many of the prewar public officials, and stipulated in the National Public Service Act that no two of the three commissioners could be members of the same political party or graduates of the same department of the same university. He selected a constitutional scholar from Keio University as the first president of the NPA. Since many of the executive officials in other ministries were graduates of Tokyo Imperial University, they had an antipathy to the NPA, which was hostile to academic cliques. The second reason was the concern that the NPA would encroach on the personnel authority of each ministry and agency. To establish scientific personnel management, the NPA began to create a job classification system as a basis for this. The job classification system was designed to determine remunerations and appointments according to duties, and was incompatible with prewar personnel management, which assigned status and duties to individual officials without a strict classification of duties. Ministries and agencies were reluctant to cooperate in job classification and were uncomfortable with the new personnel management through the job classification system. Ultimately, the NPA decided in the mid-1950s not to implement a job classification system. This was because the detailed American-style job classification did not fit Japan’s fluid job assignment to a work unit known as the “large room principle (obeyashugi)”. The NPA then decided to use the salary grades as a substitute for the job classification system to fit Japanese personnel management. The third reason was the remuneration recommendations, which were unpopular with both labor and government. The labor side preferred to set remunerations through collective bargaining rather than recommendation, while the government side found it burdensome to implement a recommendation each year that did not take into account the financial situation. In fact, it took 22 years for remuneration recommendations to be fully implemented in 1970. Due to this backlash, the NPA was in danger of being abolished after the GHQ occupation ended. The debate over the NPA focused on its independence, the scope of its authority, and the issue of basic labor rights. Some scholars questioned the constitutionality of the NPA, arguing that its independence had no constitutional basis, and others challenged the validity of the NPA’s rules regulating the political conduct of public employees. Since the NPA served as a compensatory measure for the restriction of basic labor rights, the abolition or downsizing of the NPA was also discussed in terms of basic labor rights. Opposition parties such as the Socialist Party and the Communist Party (LDP), together with the public sector unions, demanded full guarantees of basic labor rights, but the conservative Liberal Democratic Party, which had been in power for a long time, opposed them. In the end, the NPA remained as a compensatory measure for restricting basic labor rights. Beginning in the late 1950s, the ratification of ILO Convention No. 87, along with discussions on employee organizations (public sector unions), led to a proposal to reorganize the NPA, which had nothing to do with the Convention. Eventually, in 1965, the National Public Service Act was amended to clarify the government’s responsibility as an employer, and the Prime Minister 9
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